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Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the 
study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attri-
bute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these 
two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive 
processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abili-
ties such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief 
tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the 
(elicited-response) false belief test at age four, depend on children’s ability 
to explain people’s reasons to act in conversation with adults. Accordingly, 
rather than embodied, late theory-of-mind abilities are embedded in an 
external linguistic practice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have seen the birth of a new conception of the mind, namely, 
embodied cognition (Varela et al. 1991; Steels & Brooks 1995; Clark 1997, 2008; 
Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Shapiro 2011). Briefly, embodied cognition asserts that 
our physical constitution, that is, the body, matters to the definition of our mental 
life. In opposition to traditional cognitive psychology, according to which 
cognitive activity depends on the manipulation of amodal representations that 
control motor responses, embodied cognition states that perception and action 
are constitutive of mental representations. Accordingly, motor as well as sensory 
processes have a central role in the definition of cognition. 
 Embodied cognition supports a principle of economy in the definition of 
cognitive processes: It suggests substituting, until possible, reference to amodal 
representations with workable hypotheses about the functioning of sensory and 
motor systems.1 This is also consistent with evolutionary explanations: 
                                                
      I wish to thank Jay Garfield, Zuzanna Rucinska, Silvano Zipoli Caiani, and two anonymous 
reviewers for useful discussion and comments on previous versions of this article. Prepa-
ration of this article was supported by a Short Research Grant for Doctoral Candidates and 
Young Academics and Scientists from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). 
    1 Consider, for instance, how Barsalou (1999) replaces Paivio’s (1986) reference to a symbolic 
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“[E]volution capitalized on existing brain mechanisms to implement conceptual 
systems rather than creating new ones” (Yeh & Barsalou 2006: 374). Theoretical 
economy and evolutionary plausibility thus make the framework of embodied 
cognition appealing and desirable for the study of cognition. However, economy 
and plausibility are not compelling reasons to accept embodied cognition. 
Whether it defines a valuable framework to explain cognitive activity, in general, 
and more specific cognitive competences, in particular, is an empirical issue, 
which is worth of consideration. 
 In this article, I investigate whether embodied cognition is compatible with 
social cognitive development and, in particular, with the capacity to attribute 
mental states (such as beliefs, desires, and intentions) to others in order to predict 
and explain their behaviour.2 Although investigation on children’s acquisition of 
this capacity dates back almost thirty years ago (Wimmer & Perner 1983; Baron-
Cohen et al. 1985), traditional accounts of social cognitive development have 
never considered the possibility that it stands for an embodied capacity. This 
came to a reason. On the one hand, modularist accounts of theory-of-mind acqui-
sition (Perner 1991; Baron-Cohen 1994, 1995; Leslie 1994, 1995; Scholl & Leslie 
1999) usually referred to sentence-like representations to describe the processing 
of the cognitive mechanism implementing theory-of-mind abilities; thereby, they 
assumed an amodal medium of representation that is incompatible with 
embodied cognition. On the other hand, child-as-scientist accounts (Gopnik 1990, 
1996; Carey & Spelke 1996; Wellman & Gelman 1997; Wellman 2002) prefer-
entially focused children’s theoretical understanding of folk psychology and left 
aside the analysis of cognitive processes.3 
 Recent research however allows rethinking the embodiment of theory-of-
mind abilities. Based on evidence from the false belief test (FBT) paradigm, 
traditional explanations of theory-of-mind acquisition assumed that children 
acquire the ability to attribute false beliefs to others in their fourth year of life 
(Wellman et al. 2001; Wellman & Liu 2004; Liu et al. 2008). Recent results however 
demonstrated that even infants in their second year of life seem to attribute false 
beliefs when simplified versions of FBT and behavioural responses are 
considered (see Baillargeon et al. 2010 and Sodian 2011 for updated reviews and 
discussion about alternative interpretations). Because these recent results 
demonstrate that theory-of-mind abilities are acquired earlier than previously 
reported, they raise the possibility that theory of mind is embodied in early 
                                                                                                                                 
code for mental representations with reference to a network of multi-modal associations. 
    2 The acquisition of this capacity has traditionally been interpreted as equivalent to the poss-
ession of a ‘theory of mind’ (Premack & Woodruff 1978). Further evidence however impor-
tantly questioned the idea that such a capacity is acquired all in once due to the maturation 
of one cognitive mechanism. In what follows, I will hence distinguish early and late social 
cognitive abilities — I will consciously employ the expression ‘social cognitive abilities’ as a 
synonym for the more specific capacities manifested in false belief tasks. Whenever the term 
‘social cognition’ will be used, it will preferentially refer to early social cognitive abilities, 
such as those manifested in spontaneous-response tasks. Instead, I will talk about ‘theory of 
mind’ to refer to late social cognitive abilities as manifested by the capacity to pass the tradi-
tional false belief test (see further). 
    3 Simulation theory (Gordon 1986, 2007; Harris 1989; Heal 1986, 1998; Gallese & Goldman 
1998; Goldman 2006) represents a case apart. I will discuss embodied accounts of theory-of-
mind acquisition related to it in the long of this article.  
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sensory–motor skills. They also suggest that the capacity to pass FBT is not as 
central as previously thought to the acquisition of a theory of mind — as some 
had already claimed (e.g., Fodor 1992; Bloom & German 2000). But these results 
are merely suggestive. They leave open the question of which competences 
underlie the acquisition of this ability and whether those competences fit the 
framework of embodied cognition.  
 This article is devoted to the exploration of these two perspectives. I will 
claim that early social cognitive abilities are probably embodied inasmuch as 
available evidence is consistent with their implementation by cognitive processes 
integrating sensory–motor information. On the other hand, I will argue that late 
social cognitive abilities are embedded in social and dialogical practices — and, 
in particular, that the ability to pass FBT at age four denotes the acquisition of a 
minimal capacity to explain people’s reasons to act. Embodiment and embedded-
ness are two logically distinct hypotheses about the nature of cognition, each 
appropriate to some cognitive skills, and not to others. Late social cognitive abili-
ties thus fall beyond the borders of embodiment. I will conclude that theory of 
mind is a composed competence that stands in a complex relationship with the 
principle of embodiment: It is likely partially embodied, and partially not, but the 
part that is not is likely embedded. 
 Section 1 clarifies which conception of embodiment is at stake when 
discussing whether theory-of-mind abilities are embodied. It also distinguishes 
embodiment and embeddedness as two logically different principles about the 
nature of cognition. In section 2, I discuss how the empirical plausibility of an 
embodied approach to early social cognition is challenged by mentalist interpre-
tations. I argue that embodiment accounts advance a coherent and plausible 
interpretation that is not dismissed by mentalist pre-theoretical intuitions. 
 In section 3, I claim that the crucial argument in favor of mentalist interpre-
tations presupposes that early social cognitive abilities develop in continuity with 
later theory-of-mind capacities. However, I show that empirical evidence discon-
firms continuity in social cognitive development. It follows that mentalist inter-
pretations are not in a better position than embodied approaches in describing 
the earliest forms of social cognition. Empirical investigation should take very 
seriously the task of deciding to what extend infants’ social cognitive abilities can 
be accounted for by relatively simple embodied processes and mechanisms. 
 Section 4 turns on four-year-olds’ acquired capacity to pass FBT and rejects 
three different explanations of its developmental pattern, one of them being 
based on the role of the executive function two others on different aspects of 
language acquisition. In section 5, I propose as an alternative that the capacity to 
pass FBT depends on a minimal ability to explain people’s reasons to act. I 
review empirical evidence supporting my proposal, and conclude that late 
theory-of-mind abilities fit the principles of embedded rather than embodied 
cognition. 
 
 
2. Embodied, Situated, and Embedded Cognition 
 
Discussing whether theory-of-mind abilities are embodied first requires clari-
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fying which conception of embodiment is at stake. Generally speaking, embodied 
cognition asserts that our physical constitution, that is, the body, matters to the 
definition of our mental life. Although this general principle can be refined or 
expanded in several ways (Wilson 2002; Anderson 2003; Kiverstein & Clark 
2009), it minimally requires only that the processes implementing cognitive abili-
ties importantly rely on sensory (e.g., somatosensitive, interoceptive, propriocep-
tive) and motor representations (Goldman & de Vignemont 2009; Gallese & 
Sinigaglia 2011). 
 This formulation may appear inadequate for at least two reasons. First, 
even traditional cognitivists acknowledge that sensory and motor processes 
trivially have a role in cognition. By requiring that they must play an ‘important’ 
role, embodied cognition stresses that sensory and motor processes must be 
central even to the definition of high-level cognitive abilities. Second, anti-repre-
sentationalist embodiment theorists (e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thelen & Smith 1994; 
Steels & Brooks 1995; Chemero 2009) would say that this formulation is too weak 
because sensory–motor processes sufficiently define cognitive activity without 
the need of positing inner representations. Still, embodiment as a principle 
neither requires nor denies the existence of mental representations. I believe that 
this formulation would be accepted by most of its non-radical supporters. In 
what follows, I will hence assume that this formulation correctly states a viable 
minimal definition of embodiment: In order to be embodied, social cognitive 
abilities need to be implemented by cognitive processes that importantly rely on 
sensory and motor information.4 
 Before going further, it is important to disentangle embodiment from two 
close principles. Making this distinction will come at help later when discussing 
how it relates to different components of theory-of-mind abilities. Situated 
cognition asserts that we cannot artificially separate the body, thereby cognitive 
activity, from the environment in which it is placed.5 Situated cognition differs 
from embodiment in that it stresses the role of background information to the 
processing of any stimulus (Yeh & Barsalou 2006; Barsalou 2009), whereas the 
latter focuses on the role of the body in actively engaging the organism with the 
environment. 
 Embodied cognition has also to be distinguished from embeddedness, which 
highlights the role of external structures in supporting and scaffolding cognitive 
activity.6 Embeddedness supports a principle of conceptual economy for cogni-
                                                
    4 This is substantially a re-proposal of Goldman & de Vignemont’s (2009) definition of em-
bodied cognition. It is less exposed to anti-representational concerns because ‘representa-
tions in a bodily format’ have been replaced by reference to their vehicles, i.e. cognitive 
processes integrating sensory and motor information. 
    5 Situatedness is closely related to ecologism (Gibson 1979), which states that behavior cannot 
be studied independently of the environment in which it occurs. It is also presupposed by 
enactivist approaches — in both their representationalist (Grush 2004; Noë 2005) and anti-
representational versions (Chemero 2009; e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thelen & Smith 1994; Steels 
& Brooks 1995) — according to which cognition is the outcome of the interaction between 
the body and the environment so that action, not only perception, is constitutive of cognitive 
activity. Situatedness is however a weaker principle than enactivism, which also assumes 
the truth of embodiment.  
    6 We continuously modify and construct the space around us disseminating information in it 
to our next benefit. Think about how we re-locate objects in our house not to stub our toe on 
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tion in a direction opposite to embodiment. Where embodiment points to 
conceptual economy in the inwards direction of the modal nature of mental 
representations, which are the inner vehicles of cognition, embeddedness points 
instead to the outwards direction of the environment, which simplifies cognitive 
processes by scaffolding cognitive activity. 
 Moreover, not every form of embedded cognition is situated (and vice 
versa but I will not pursue this here). Language, for instance, is a powerful tool to 
discharge the computational complexity of a task (e.g., remembering a long 
sequence of actions) on an external support (e.g., a piece of paper, or a sentence 
one can rehearse by the help of auditory memory) (Vygotsky 1934, 1978). How-
ever, although language is learned in interaction with the (social) environment, it 
is later internalised (Berk 1991; Winsler et al. 2003), and can be used as a symbolic 
tool in isolation from the environment (Clark 1998). Language acquisition thus 
deeply impacts on cognition disregarding the situatedness of the cognizer 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992; Clark & Karmiloff-Smith 1993).7 
 
 
2. Embodied Cognition and Early Social Cognitive Abilities 
 
I have made explicit a minimal conception of embodiment. I have also 
distinguished it from the two closely related principles of situated and embedded 
cognition. We can now start investigating whether the capacity to attribute 
mental states can be defined in a cognitive system so characterized. 
 Recent research employing violation-of-expectancy and first looking 
paradigms recently showed that even infants seem to attribute false beliefs to 
others in their second year of life. For instance, Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) found 
that 15-month-olds look significantly longer when they see an experimenter 
acting incoherently with respect to her false beliefs. Their result, obtained in a 
violation-of-expectancy paradigm, was replicated considering 25-month-olds’ 
anticipatory looking, which is a clearer index of infants’ expectations (Southgate 
et al. 2007). In addition, Surian et al. (2007) found that 13-month-olds are already 
sensitive to one agent’s knowledge or ignorance of a situation. 
 The studies above strictly focused on visual stimulation and responses. 
Further research investigated infants’ processing of others’ beliefs obtained 
through sensory modalities other than vision and showed that infants’ social 
cognitive abilities are not restricted to the exclusive elaboration of visual input. 
Infants have been found sensitive to one agent’s false beliefs induced through 
                                                                                                                                 
them; or how we leave post-its on the fridge and knotted handkerchiefs in our pockets to 
remind of next duties; or how we fill our environment with road and shop signs. These 
activities allow us to discharge the computational complexity of cognitive processes in the 
environment. They relieve the cognitive load of memory and simplify both perception and 
action planning (Kirsh 1995; Clark 1997). 
    7 The scaffolding role of language is not limited to cognitive agents in isolation. Thanks to 
linguistic communication, cognitive processes can be distributed across the members of a 
group — as the crew of a ship (Hutchins 1995a), or the aircrew of a plane (Hutchins 1995b), 
or a surgery team — thereby supporting the execution of complex cognitive tasks. Linguisti-
cally mediated communication also allows the emergence of important forms of cultural 
transmission across generations (Dawkins 1976; Latour 1986). 
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proper communication (Song et al. 2008), through incorrect deductions from per-
ceptual cues (Song & Baillargeon 2008), and through tactile perception (Träuble et 
al. 2010). In addition, not only they consider others’ non-visually induced false 
beliefs, but they can also actively react to them (Buttelmann et al. 2009; Southgate 
et al. 2010; Knudsen 2011). 
 According to a first interpretation of these results, early forms of social 
cognition can be explained by cognitive processes that operate on perceptual 
input and mostly automatically trigger low-level motor responses (e.g., sustained 
attention and anticipatory looking). These processes integrate visual information 
that infants obtain by observing other agents, but they likely involve also motor 
representations. Extensive data indeed show that processing others’ actions 
involves the activation of pre-motor areas in adults (Wilson & Knoblich 2005; van 
Overwalle 2009), and the same likely happens even in infants (Del Giudice et al. 
2009). This first interpretation of early forms of social cognition is thus consistent 
with the definition of embodiment introduced in section 1 because, on this view, 
early social cognitive abilities are implemented by cognitive processes subserving 
both sensory and motor information. Call this the embodied view of early social 
cognitive abilities. 
 The embodied view is compatible with very different accounts of the 
capacity to attribute mental states advanced both in the philosophical and 
scientific literature.8 For instance, Gallese (2005, 2007; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011) 
argues that the same sensory–motor processes (i.e. the mirror mechanism, 
Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004) implementing one’s own mental states — e.g., one’s 
intention to act — are also used when functionally attributing the same mental 
state to another — e.g., when understanding another’s intention to act. Similarly, 
Goldman (2006, 2009) claims that mirror neurons play an important role in ‘low-
level’ mindreading and support the attribution of mental states to others. 
According to Gallagher (2008, 2011), interpreting others’ mental states depends 
on perceptual, rather than inferential, capacities that are employed in situated 
social interaction and rely on low-level sensory–motor associations developed 
since early infancy. Finally, according to De Jaeger, “social understanding 
emerges from a dynamical process of interaction and coordination of two em-
bodied subjects coupled to each other” (Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009: 470; see also De 
Jaegher 2009, McGann & De Jaegher 2009). Accordingly, we cannot disentangle 
infants’ elaboration of a perceptual input from the motor processes driving 
infants’ reaction to it. 
 These accounts differ from one another with respect to several issues: 
which kinds of mental states are attributed by the cognitive processes 
implementing early social cognitive abilities; how often these processes are at 
work in everyday social interaction; whether they can be interpreted in 
representational terms; and how they ground or implement theory-of-mind 
capacities. With respect to the last point, in particular, these accounts provide 
very different interpretations of the activity of the mirror neuron system when 
we observe others’ actions. According to Gallese, for instance, mirror neurons 
                                                
    8 The point is not that all the following accounts embraced the embodied view. Rather, they 
may agree with an embodied explanation of early social cognitive abilities. 
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underpin out understanding of motor intentionality. For Goldman, instead, they 
enable us to enter the same mental states that we observer in another person. 
Gallagher interprets the mirror neuron system as a neural mechanism supporting 
‘smart’ perception. Finally, De Jaegher is very critical of neurological explan-
ations of social cognitive abilities.9 Nevertheless, she considers that “this is not to 
say that the link between action and perception found in mirror neuron research 
does not play an important role for social understanding” (Fuchs & De Jaegher 
2009: 469). 
 Despite these differences, these accounts are nonetheless unanimous with 
regard to the following theses: (i) the attribution of mental states to others 
exploits cognitive mechanisms that are developing since early infancy; (ii) 
sensory–motor processes such as the mirror neuron system constitute the core of 
these mechanisms. Call these embodied social cognitive processes. The embodied 
view explicitly adds that (iii) embodied social cognitive processes ground infants’ 
performance in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. 
 The embodied view presupposes that manifest behavior encoded through 
visual processes and processed by the mirroring system constitutes the 
fundamental source of data that infants process in spontaneous-response false 
belief tasks. In this sense, the embodied view is sympathetic with those proposals 
explaining infants’ sensitivity to others’ false beliefs in the terms of different 
capacities to track more superficial, observational features.10 For example, it has 
been argued that infants’ performance on spontaneous-response false belief tasks 
depends on behavior-reading capacities (Penn & Povinelli 2007; Perner 2010; 
Butterfill & Apperly 2013), on the capacity to remember others’ encounter with 
objects (Apperly & Butterfill 2009; Butterfill & Apperly 2013), or to create triadic 
associations (Perner & Ruffman 2005; de Bruin & Newen 2012), or even on sensi-
tivity to affordances (de Bruin et al. 2011). 
 Notably, these (more or less strictly) behavioural accounts and the embodi-
ed view may disagree about the interpretation of the cognitive processes under-
lying infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. However, 
they are much more in agreement about the empirical nature of these processes. 
Behavioural accounts indeed argue that (i) infants’ performance in spontaneous-
response false belief tasks does not demonstrate the capacity to attribute (false) 
beliefs, and that (ii) the cognitive processes underlying infants’ looking behavior 
primarily process others’ motor intentions and goal-directed behavior. Analog-
ously, it is the empirical significance of a minimal interpretation of the embodied 
view that the capacities to process goal-directed behavior and motor intentions 
are sufficient to ground the earliest forms of social cognition. The two views are 
thus minimally consistent: They both stress the importance of processing overt 
                                                
    9 These explanations indeed “single out one section only of the whole circle of organism–
environment interaction. They fail to address social interaction as a structured and 
structuring process which in turn influences brain functions” (Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009: 
469). 
    10 Therefore, Gallagher writes: “What the enactive position adds to the behavioral abstraction 
position concerns the nature of the meaning that I see in the other’s actions. The other’s 
actions have meaning for me in terms of how I may be able to interact with her. […] I think 
this is consistent with your [the behavioural abstraction] view, but offers a specification 
about the meaning” (Gallagher & Povinelli 2012: 154).  
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behavior to display the kind of expectations manifested in spontaneous-response 
false belief tasks, and they avoid commitment to strong mentalistic interpre-
tations of early social cognitive abilities. Indeed, it is possible that the attribution 
of mental states merely globally supervenes on the sensory–motor processes 
underpinning infants’ basic abilities to process others’ behavior, and is not an 
explicit independent representational activity. 
 The alternative to the embodied view, the mentalist view, instead claims 
that infants’ early social cognitive abilities already involve the capacity to 
attribute mental states such as beliefs. For instance, Leslie (1994, 1995) advocates 
for the existence, at 18 months, of a Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM) that 
allows the use representations as meta-representations, thus constitutes the basic 
computational mechanism beyond both pretend and belief representations. 
Similarly, Baillargeon (Scott & Baillargeon 2009; Baillargeon et al. 2010) advances 
that early social cognitive abilities are provided by the maturation of a new 
modular component in the infant’s mind in the second year of life, Subsystem-2, 
which allows infants to hold in mind a separate representation of a scene. 
 It is a hallmark of the mentalist view that infants’ early social cognitive 
abilities do not exploit any behavior-reading heuristic.11 This view rejects both 
behavioural interpretations of infants’ performance in spontaneous-response 
false belief tasks and the embodied view, which is minimally consistent with 
them. And, in fact, mentalist accounts of early social cognitive abilities are often 
associated with criticisms to the fundamental importance of sensory–motor pro-
cesses to the ability of attributing mental states (e.g., Csibra 2007; Grafton 2009). 
 Despite the arguments advanced by mentalist theorists, nonetheless, the 
opposition between their rich explanation of spontaneous-response false belief 
tasks and the minimal interpretation defended by both embodied and (more or 
less strictly) behavioural accounts is far from being settled. Of course, this is an 
empirical debate, and empirical evidence may provide some reason to assess the 
contrast. If it were found, for instance, that early social cognitive abilities are not 
flexible enough to properly match mental state attributions — because, for 
example, they do not retain attributed beliefs beyond short time threshold, or 
because they are insensitive to some perceptual modality in the process of belief 
formation —, this would constitute evidence against the mentalist view. On the 
contrary, the embodied view is challenged by any result showing the complexity 
of early social cognitive abilities. In front of a very flexible behavior manifested 
by infants in a variegated set of false belief tasks, it would be more difficult to 
explain their performance in the terms of the mere capacity to process sensory–
motor information. The choice to treat their capacity as theory-of-mind abilities 
would be theoretically more parsimonious, thereby also preferable. 
 Both the embodied and the mentalist view nevertheless have general 
strategies to explain their empirical flaws. In particular, the mentalist view can 
always maintain that non-flexible manifestations of early social cognitive abilities 
                                                
    11 Adduced motivations are variegated. Leslie claims that ToMM is the essential core of 
theory-of-mind reasoning because it permits and promotes children’s attention to early 
intentional insight into the behaviors of others, thereby it allows them to learn about these 
states. Instead, according to Baillargeon, Subsystem-2 implements genuine theory-of-mind 
capacities because of reasons of parsimony (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005: 257). 
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are explained by limitation of the computational resources available to the 
working of the theory-of-mind mechanism (Fodor 1992; Leslie et al. 2005; Scott & 
Baillargeon 2009). On the other hand, the embodied view can always reduce the 
complexity of mentalist interpretations of infants’ behavior by elaborating 
behavior-reading strategies of some sort (Perner 2010; Butterfill & Apperly 2013). 
 I take those principled objections as demonstrating that the opposition 
between the embodied and the mentalist view is also partially a matter of 
theoretical preference about how to describe very simple capacities manifested in 
infancy. Although I acknowledge that solving the dispute is lastly a matter of 
empirical discussion, I want herein to consider further assumptions not clearly 
spelled out in the current debate. In defense of the embodied view, I will claim 
that it advances a coherent and plausible interpretation, which is not dismissed 
by mentalist pre-theoretical intuitions. It thus defines a concrete proposal, and it 
is should be in the agenda of future empirical investigation assessing to what 
extend infants’ social cognitive abilities can be accounted for by relatively simple 
embodied processes and mechanisms. 
 The issue whether (amodal) mental states can in principle be computed by 
cognitive processes that principally integrate sensory–motor information is 
particularly relevant to the assessment of the assumptions in favor and against 
embodied interpretations. With this respect, the embodied view favors that 
amodality can effectively be reduced to interwoven cross-modal connections 
(Barsalou 2005; Goldman & de Vignemont 2009; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011). 
Accordingly, also the attribution of mental states to others can be implemented 
by cognitive mechanisms processing sensory–motor information and directly 
triggering automatic motor responses. Instead, the mentalist view holds that 
processing sensory–motor information cannot account for the attribution of 
mental states for the very nature of the modally-non-neutral information that is 
processed. Nothing less than theory-of-mind processes can account for social 
cognitive abilities even in infancy. 
 It is important to note that the embodied view advances a specific claim 
about the modal nature of information, which can be empirically investigated. 
The mentalist alternative, on the other hand, merely relies on a principled and, as 
I see it, unsuccessful objection. Moreover, as discussed above, the embodied view 
also suggests a viable alternative explanation to data concerning social cognitive 
abilities in infancy in agreement with (more or less strictly) behavioural accounts. 
Therefore, if we only consider social cognitive capacities apparent in the second 
year, the available evidence does not decide between embodied and mentalist 
interpretations of social cognitive abilities. But if we look more broadly, the 
evidence supports the embodied alternative. For the sake of parsimony, indeed, 
there is no need to assume that infants can attribute (false) beliefs if the same 
cognitive abilities can be explained by more basic capacities to process manifest 
behavior and motor intentions.   
 There is, however, a second argument advanced in favor of the mentalist 
view. Rather than focusing on the second year of life, it hinges on the gradual 
development of social cognitive abilities from infancy to early childhood. I will 
assess it in the next section. 
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3. Social Cognitive Development from Infancy to Early Childhood 
 
The argument from the continuity of social cognitive development states that (i) 
infants’ selective behavior in spontaneous-response false belief tasks appears 
before their capacity to pass FBT at age four, and that (ii) this capacity is usually 
interpreted as the explicit manifestation of the possession of the concept of belief, 
and so that (iii) infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false belief tasks is 
the implicit manifestation of the concept of belief. 
 The argument underlies many mentalist interpretations of early social 
cognitive abilities. For instance, Poulin-Dubois et al. (2009) report data from 
longitudinal studies finding that children’s performance on traditional false 
belief tasks is predicted by earlier ability to understand goal-directed actions with 
computer-animated geometric forms (Yamaguchi et al. 2009) or to identify 
behavioural cues of intentional action in an imitation task (Colonnesi et al. 2008). 
Hence they conclude that “the current data suggest continuity in social cognitive 
development that provides support for the hypothesis that the sophisticated 
social cognitive abilities have their roots in infancy” (p. 91). 
 Unfortunately for the mentalist view, however, that early social cognitive 
abilities develop before the capacity to pass FBT does not demonstrate that they 
are the precursors of this capacity. This conclusion follows only if this capacity is 
demonstrated to develop in strict continuity with them. Therefore, continuity in 
social cognitive development is the test bed to decide whether mentalist inter-
pretations of early social cognitive abilities are to be preferred to the embodied 
view. It is on this issue that I will now turn my attention. 
 Some empirical evidence attests gradual development in social cognition. 
Southgate et al. (2007) found that 25-month-olds gaze in anticipation towards a 
location where a person would be expected to search if she had a false belief. This 
extends Onishi & Baillargeon’s (2005) result by relating early social cognitive 
abilities to a more active behavior (i.e. anticipatory gaze). Still two-year-olds are 
limited in the kind of stimulation that can enhance their anticipatory-looking 
response. In Southgate and colleagues’ study, infants anticipatory looking was 
prompted by a visual stimulation, but Clements & Perner (1994) and Garnham & 
Ruffman (2001) found that it cannot be triggered by verbal prompting until age 
three. 
 These studies suggest the following developmental pattern for social 
cognitive abilities: (i) after 15 months, the cognitive processes responsible for 
social cognitive abilities can already direct infants’ attention at the incongruent 
behaviour of an agent; (ii) after age two, they also start driving anticipatory 
looking reactions; (iii) at age three, they start bring prompted by verbal 
stimulation; (iv) finally around age four, they fully integrate with linguistic 
abilities, thereby also allow children to correctly answer FBT. 
 Considering this evidence, Baillargeon (Scott & Baillargeon 2009; Baillar-
geon et al. 2010; cf. also Leslie 2005) claimed that young children fail elicited-
response FBT because it involves the functioning of at least three different pro-
cesses. In particular: (i) a process to represent others’ false-beliefs, (ii) a process to 
select the proper response when asked about others’ behavior, and (iii) a process 
to inhibit the tendency to answer the test question based on one’s own 
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knowledge. Since spontaneous-response tasks only tap psychological-reasoning, 
they are passed earlier than traditional elicited-response false belief tasks. As 
soon as response-selection mechanisms develop (or interface themselves with 
psychological-reasoning processes) children’s anticipatory-looking starts respon-
ding to verbal prompts. Finally, when response-inhibition processes properly 
develop, children also become able to pass elicited-response tasks. 
 Important considerations nevertheless reject continuity in the development 
from early social cognition to late theory-of-mind abilities. A first hint comes 
when considering a possible double dissociation between early and more mature 
social cognitive abilities.12 Senju and collaborators (Senju et al. 2009, 2010; see also 
Senju 2011 for a discussion) found that autistic people are impaired on spontane-
ous-response false belief tasks while at the same time they pass elicited-response 
tasks (Happé 1995) — their performance being strongly related to their linguistic 
abilities (Tager-Flusberg & Joseph 2005). This pattern is opposed to the one of 
three-year-olds, who are impaired on elicited-response tasks while at the same 
time they pass spontaneous-response tasks. This suggests that the two tasks map 
different capacities. 
 Secondly, if the cognitive processes implementing early social cognitive 
abilities progressively develop in continuity with more advanced social 
competence, one would expect cognitive biases affecting late social cognitive 
abilities to be present even at earlier developmental stages. However, a central 
bias to the capacity to pass FBT such as the ‘curse of knowledge’ (Birch & Bloom 
2003, 2004, 2007) genuinely affects only four-year-olds’ performance on elicited-
response tasks, while it spares infants’ early social cognitive abilities.13 This 
challenges the hypothesis that passing FBT at age four depends on the same 
processes already in place around age two (Samson & Apperly 2010). 
 Finally and critically, increasing evidence supports a multi-process theory 
of social cognitive abilities. On the one hand, empirical findings suggest that 
beliefs are not automatically attributed in FBT. Apperly et al. (2006) reasoned that 
if this were the case, we should consider others’ beliefs even when not requested 
to do so. They thus probed experimental subjects with unpredictable questions 
about what was happening in a video; the questions concerned either the location 
of an object, which participant were requested to track, or a false belief of the 
main character, which were irrelevant to the task goal. They found that longer 
response times and higher errors where connected to answers about the 
character’s false belief, suggesting that subjects normally did not track it. Also, 
explicitly requiring subjects to track the character’s belief eliminated the 
asymmetry between belief- and reality-answers, suggesting that such asymmetry 
                                                
    12 Though see Scerif & Karmiloff-Smith (2005) for a warning about the misuse of double 
dissociations in cognitive neuroscience. 
    13 The curse of knowledge refers to the fact that children as well as adults find it difficult to 
stop considering their own knowledge when asked to assess others’ perspectives. That the 
curse of knowledge spares early social cognitive abilities provides no surprise in the 
experiment by Southgate et al. (2007), where the object that is the content of the false belief is 
taken out of the scene before infants’ response is prompted. No actual knowledge of the 
object’s location thus misleads infants’ reaction. This is however not the case in the 
experiments by Clements & Perner (1994), Garnham & Ruffman (2001), and Onishi & 
Baillargeon (2005).  
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depended on the cost of retrieving the character’s belief. 
 Contrary to the case of belief attribution, other findings instead suggest that 
adults automatically compute others’ visual experience even when they 
themselves have a different view (Samson et al. 2010). This result has been 
demonstrated in six-year-olds (Surtees & Apperly 2012) and, surprisingly, even 
in seven-month-olds (Kovács et al. 2010).14 However, this capacity is importantly 
limited in many respects: It does not consider level-2 visual perspective taking 
(Surtees et al. 2011), and it is impaired when the other’s perspective includes 
complex scenarios (Keysar et al. 2000, 2003). 
 In the light of these results, Apperly & Butterfill (2009; cf. also Frith & Frith 
2006; Apperly 2010) suggested that adults compute others’ mental states by two 
kinds of cognitive process. High-level social cognitive processes develop in early 
childhood and allow children to pass complex tasks such as elicited-response 
FBTs. They are highly flexible but cognitively demanding, therefore they do not 
get automatically employed. In contrast, low-level social cognitive processes 
develop in infancy and have likely been naturally selected. They are cognitively 
efficient, because they rely on the elaboration of simple features of the perceived 
input, and explain infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false belief 
tasks. However, the same reason why they are cognitively efficient also makes 
them inflexible. Indeed, they are very limited both in the kind of information 
they can process and in how their outcome can influence other cognitive 
processes. That is, they are encapsulated and impenetrable: They are activated only 
by some specific available input, and are of no help to solve general domain 
problems (Fodor 1983; Coltheart 1999). 
 Importantly to the present discussion, empirical investigation indicates that 
early and late social cognitive abilities are provided by completely different 
cognitive processes. Accordingly, cognitive development does not progress 
continuously from infancy to early childhood. This rejects the mentalist theorist’s 
argument that the cognitive processes underlying early forms of social cognition 
must be interpreted in strong mentalistic terms because they represent the early 
roots of mature theory-of-mind abilities. 
 In light of the empirical inadequacy of the argument from the continuity in 
social cognitive development, and considering that mentalist interpretations 
about early social cognitive abilities inconclusively oppose embodied accounts, 
we must thus leave it open how to interpret infants’ performance in spontaneous-
response false belief tasks. Given the severe limitations of infants’ early social 
cognitive abilities, adopting the full vocabulary of folk psychology to describe 
them may be incorrect, whenever misleading (cf. Kagan 2008 for the same argu-
ment against very young infants’ possession of the concepts of number and 
object). 
 Concluding, it is up to future empirical investigation deciding to what 
extend infants’ social cognitive abilities can be accounted for by relatively simple 
embodied processes and mechanisms. However, theoretical reflection 
                                                
    14 Interestingly, Kovács and colleagues interpret their result in the terms of the capacity to con-
sider others’ beliefs, although what they really assessed is the subject’s capacity to recall 
what other agents saw. This is a good example of over-interpretation of experimental evi-
dence. 
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demonstrates that we are not committed to interpret them in a strong mentalistic 
vocabulary. Consistently with the embodied view, the cognitive processes 
underlying early social cognitive abilities may be the outcome of a minimal 
capacity to attribute motor intentions and goal-directed behavior. Coherently 
with (more or less strictly) behavioural accounts, they may even depend on less 
sophisticated embodied competences that do not have a direct translation in the 
vocabulary of folk psychology. Inasmuch as these two interpretations do not 
mutually exclude but agree about the empirical nature of the cognitive processes 
underlying early social cognitive abilities, rejecting strong mentalist accounts 
paves the way to an alternative interpretation coherent with the embodied view. 
 
 
4. Explaining Theory-of-Mind Acquisition in Early Childhood 
 
If early social cognitive abilities already reflected the capacity to attribute beliefs 
to others, learning to pass FBT at age four would not be a milestone in children’s 
social cognitive development. This would constitute a priori reason not to 
investigate whether this ability is implemented in embodied cognitive processes. 
However, the discontinuity between early and late social cognitive abilities 
attests that elicited- and spontaneous-response false belief tasks are rather 
distinct. Passing elicited-response FBT thus identifies an autonomous compe-
tence in child development.15 Accordingly, it is still worth investigating whether 
this ability fits the framework of embodied cognition. In this section, I discuss 
and reject three explanations of the acquisition of the capacity to pass FBT. This 
will clear the field to my alternative proposal. 
 A first attempt to explain children’s acquisition of the capacity to pass FBT 
has appealed to the maturation, around age four, of several components of the 
executive function:16 in particular, the capacity to inhibit stimulus-dependent 
answers (Carlson & Moses 2001; Jacques & Zelazo 2005; Sabbagh et al. 2006), 
cognitive flexibility (Carlson & Moses 2001; Müller et al. 2005; Guajardo et al. 
2009), and visual perspective taking (Harris 1992; Gopnik et al. 1994; Farrant et al. 
2006; Bigelow & Dugas 2008). This explanation of four-year-olds’ acquired capa-
city to pass FBT is also provided by contemporary modularist accounts of the 
theory of mind — namely, those accounts supporting the mentalist view of early 
social cognitive abilities (sections 2 and 3). 
                                                
    15 And indeed, the capacity to pass FBT has been demonstrated extremely robust and unlikely 
depending on minor changes in previous cognitive development. Allowing children to 
respond by sticking surprised or non-surprised facial expressions (de Villiers & de Villiers 
2000), or proper thought (Wellman et al. 1996; Woolfe et al. 2002), as well as hide and retrieve 
tasks (Call & Tomasello 1999; Figueras-Costa & Harris 2001) did not improve four-year-olds’ 
performance in any sensitive way, while only mild improvements were found when 
allowing children to respond by appropriate hand-gesture (Carlson et al. 2005), betting coins 
(Ruffman et al. 2001) and lying by deceiving pointing rather than explicit verbal communi-
cation (Perner et al. 2002). 
    16 By ‘executive function’, cognitive psychologists refer to the suite of cognitive functions 
supporting goal directed behavior and cognitive control across conceptual domains, 
including inhibitory control (or response inhibition), working memory, error monitoring, 
rule representation and use, planning, behaviour organisation, cognitive flexibility, and 
attentional control (Zelazo et al. 2008).  
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 Several findings nevertheless suggest that the executive function really 
provides only a marginal contribution to the development of theory-of-mind 
abilities. Firstly, although autistic children do not pass FBT, they normally 
perform on executive function tasks when tested by a computer rather than by a 
person (Ozonoff et al. 1991; Ozonoff 1995). Secondly, language delayed deaf 
children raised by hearing parents are not at all impaired in executive function 
such as non-verbal working memory, inhibitory control, and conditional rule 
following; still they fail FBT (P.A. de Villiers 2005). Finally, children in Asian 
countries manifest earlier competence than their Western peers at executive 
function tasks, the effect perhaps being due to their education more inclined 
toward self-control. Nevertheless, early improved executive function does not 
translate into superior performance in FBT (Sabbagh et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2008; Oh 
& Lewis 2008; Lewis et al. 2009).17 
 Language acquisition constitutes a better candidate than the maturation of 
the executive function to account for children’s late acquisition of theory-of-mind 
abilities. Meta-analyses showed that the capacity to pass FBT relates to linguistic 
competence, the correlation from linguistic abilities to social understanding being 
stronger than the opposite (Astington & Baird 2005b; Milligan et al. 2007). Still, 
even when focusing on the contribution of language to FBT passing, many 
different aspects of language acquisition may be relevant (Astington & Baird 
2005; de Villiers 2007: 1869–1871). Investigating the embodiment of late social 
cognitive abilities thus depends on assessing their different contribution. 
 One explanation that may account for the correlation between language 
acquisition and FBT passing is that younger children lack the representational 
capacity to store others’ (false) beliefs (Leekam & Perner 1991; Perner 1995; 
Leekam et al. 2008). Accordingly, FBT would measure children’s meta-represen-
tational abilities. Language acquisition may thus impact children’s capacity to 
pass FBT because, by enabling new representational formats (Karmiloff-Smith 
1992), it enables and/or improves the representation of the mental states.  
 This explanation is strongly supported by de Villiers and collaborators’ 
finding that syntax acquisition, and, in particular, the mastery of sentential 
complements — i.e. the sentences introduced by a ‘that’ in mental propositional 
attitudes (e.g., “he thinks that-p”) as well as reporting attitudes (e.g., “he says 
that-p”) — is predictive of children’s ability to pass FBT (de Villiers & Pyers 2002; 
de Villiers & de Villiers 2003; J.G. de Villiers 2005, 2009).18 On de Villiers’ original 
interpretation, this was considered evidence that the mastery of sentential 
complements reshapes children’s cognition by providing a new representational 
format to store meta-representations, therefore also to attribute beliefs to others.19 
                                                
        17   Cf. also Sabbagh et al. (2010) for an extended criticism of the role of the executive function in 
promoting late social cognitive abilities. 
    18 The result has been confirmed by comparative studies on different populations of deaf 
children (Peterson & Siegal 2000; Garfield et al. 2001; P.A. de Villiers 2005; Pyers & Senghas 
2009; Schick et al. 2007), and by training studies, where children were trained in FBT, a Test 
for Complements and other relevant tasks (Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003; Lohmann & Toma-
sello 2003; Lohmann et al. 2005). 
    19 This proposal shares with embodied cognition the focus on cognitive development to 
explain social cognitive development. Nevertheless, it does not agree with embodied 
cognition on the representational format encoding belief attributions. Indeed, it supposes 
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 Several findings nevertheless reject de Villiers’ analysis that representing 
others’ beliefs is the main problem in FBT. Indeed, according to de Villiers, there 
must be one moment in which children learn how to represent sentential comple-
ments. However, several studies demonstrated that children start mastering 
complementation at different ages depending on the context in which it occurs. 
This is revealed by considering sentential complements selected by desire verbs 
in German (Perner et al. 2003), by pretence verbs (Garfield et al. 2009), as well as 
relative clauses (Smith et al. 2003).20 Moreover, de Villiers’ proposal advances that 
children’s difficulty with FBT depends on the general understanding that verbs 
of thought select either true or false sentential complements. However, the 
mastery of complementation likely predicts FBT passing only because it requires 
children to understand that verbs of thought can specifically select false comple-
ments (Cheung et al. 2004, 2009). And indeed, although the mastery of sentential 
complements is sufficient to pass FBT, children’s difficulty also partially depends 
just on the comprehension of the deceiving character of the false beliefs 
(Lohmann & Tomasello 2003; Lohmann et al. 2005). Therefore, providing the right 
representational format to represent others’ beliefs is unlikely the exclusive 
reason why language acquisition supports late social cognitive development. 
 A second attempted explanation of the correlation between language 
acquisition and FBT passing is that FBT requires children to master not just the 
representational format of attributed beliefs and desires, but also belief–desire 
reasoning, that is, the capacity to inferentially combine attributed mental states to 
make predictions about others’ future actions. This proposal is largely shared 
among supporters of both the modularist and the child-as-scientist view of the 
theory (cf. the introduction), who advanced that passing FBT require children to 
develop (either implicit or explicit) inferential abilities. Accordingly, language 
acquisition would improve the capacity to pass FBT by bolstering children’s 
belief–desire reasoning capacities. 
 Despite its popularity, we should be cautious to adopt this solution: In fact, 
several reasons suggest that belief–desire reasoning is really not needed to pass 
FBT. A first weak argument is that we do not consciously perform belief–desire 
reasoning very often (Gallagher 2007). Secondly, folk psychology apparently 
works differently across different cultures (e.g., Lillard 1998; Vinden 1999); this 
should lead to the conclusion that passing FBT is culture dependent — a result 
for which partial evidence has been provided (Wellman et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2008; 
Shahaeian et al. 2011). Third, passing FBT by belief–desire reasoning poses a typi-
cal inverse problem (Csibra & Gergely 2007) which requires solving an abductive 
inference. This makes unlikely that children rely on belief–desire reasoning to 
pass the test (Apperly 2010; cf. also Ratcliffe 2007; Perner & Roessler 2010; de 
Bruin et al. 2011 for related discussion). 
                                                                                                                                 
that others’ beliefs are encoded in sentence-like representations, that is, in an amodal repre-
sentational medium that is very different from sensory and motor representations. 
    20 J. G. de Villiers (2005) opposed that only the mastery of that-clauses selected by verbs of 
thought is predictive of children’s ability to pass FBT, and proposed that such a competence 
is scaffolded by their experience with verbs of speech (e.g., saying, telling). However, there is 
no evidence in the literature for a developmental gap between the mastery of verbs of 
speech and the mastery of thinking verbs. 
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 Of course, denying that the mastery of belief–desire reasoning is not 
necessary to pass FBT requires explaining why belief–desire reasoning is 
apparently so pervasive in everyday life (Spaulding 2010). However, note that 
folk psychology and the attribution of mental states are often employed to explain 
past actions rather than to predict future ones. Therefore, the pervasiveness of 
belief–desire reasoning may well depend on its relevance in rationalizing 
people’s behavior by reporting their reasons to act.21 If that is the case, we can ab-
andon the idea that passing FBT requires the mastery of belief–desire reasoning. 
 I have rejected three explanations of four-year-olds’ acquired ability to pass 
FBT, one of them being based on the role of the executive function two others on 
different aspects of language acquisition. In the next section, I will introduce my 
alternative proposal. We will hence be in position to judge whether late theory-
of-mind abilities fit the framework of the embodied cognition. 
 
 
5. Embedded Cognition and Theory-of-Mind Acquisition 
 
My previous analysis rejected two explanations of the correlation between lang-
uage acquisition and four-year-olds’ acquired capacity to pass FBT. However, it 
has not refuted the main idea that passing FBT depends on language acquisition. 
My proposal carves out an alternative explanation for that. 
 I suggest that passing FBT demonstrates the acquisition of a minimal 
capacity to explain people’s reasons to act. Since the very early infancy, children 
are continuously exposed to stories and narratives that clarify the reasons why 
people acted in the way they did. Although full reasons defined by belief–desire 
pairs are rarely provided, these stories identify relevant constituents of these 
reasons (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions, behavioural traits, personality features) 
and acquaint children with the domain of folk psychology (Hutto 2008; Nelson 
2009). I claim that children’s acquaintance with these narratives, and in particular 
with those stories focusing false utterances, the deceiving aspect of things, and 
lying behaviors, promotes their understanding of the reasons beyond (unsuccess-
ful) action and improve their capacity to pass FBT. I also propose that dialogical 
ex-changes where people’s behavior is explained by the attribution of (false) 
beliefs trigger the acquisition of explanatory capacities in the domain of folk 
psychology. Accordingly, language acquisition affects children’s capacity to pass 
FBT because linguistic interaction in the social environment, and, in particular, 
specific dialogical exchanges where false beliefs are the matter of discussion, 
provide the main evidence necessary to them to pass FBT. 
 Before further discussion, let me introduce empirical evidence supporting 
my proposals.  First of all, although I opposed de Villiers’ claim that children 
younger than four lack the representational capacity to store others’ (false) 
beliefs, her finding that the mastery of sentential complements is predictive of 
children’s ability to pass FBT is in itself significant and requires explanation. 
According to my proposal, children must understand that false beliefs sometimes 
are good reasons for action before they can pass FBT. Now, sentential comple-
ments are the syntactic structures normally employed to report false belief 
                                                
        21   A  similar  point  has  been  suggested  by  Slors  (2012)  and  Van  Cleave  &  Gauker  (2010).  
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attributions. It comes to a reason that children need to master complementation 
before they can pass FBT. 
 A second piece of relevant evidence comes from studies assessing the 
frequency of mental state lexicon in parental conversation. According to my 
proposal, understanding people’s reasons to act is developed in specific 
dialogical exchanges where people’s behavior is explained by the attribution of 
mental states. Accordingly, children who have more chances to take part to those 
dialogical exchanges should be expected to pass FBT earlier. On the contrary, 
finding that the amount of dialogical exchanges involving psychological 
discourse does not correlate with the ability to pass FBT would oppose my 
analysis. 
 Considering the empirical literature, many studies extensively showed that 
the frequency of mental terms in parental conversation predicts children’s ability 
to pass FBT (Dunn et al. 1991; Furrow et al. 1992; Moore et al. 1994; Sabbagh & 
Callanan 1998; Ruffman et al. 2002; Meins et al. 2003; Dunn & Brophy 2005; 
Taumoepeau & Ruffman 2006). In addition, some evidence also suggests that this 
does not depend on the mere presence of mental lexicon in parental conversation, 
but on the quantity of discourse related to people’s mental states even when 
mental states are not mentioned (Turnbull et al. 2008). 
 The third evidence for my proposal comes from studies about the quality of 
the conversation between the child and the caregiver. My proposal states that 
children should advance in their understanding of the mental domain 
proportionally to the quality of the conversation about the psychological domain 
they have with their caregivers. Accordingly, children whose caregivers tend to 
entertain more prolonged exchanges of such a kind and to provide more 
feedback should be expected to pass FBT earlier. On the contrary, evidence 
opposing my model would be that the caregiver’s availability to converse with 
the child did not correlate with children’s ability to pass FBT. 
 In the empirical literature, several indices have been advanced to assess the 
quality of parental conversation. Ontai & Thompson (2008) shaped an elaborative 
discourse index, which assesses the parental disposition to elaborate children’s 
utterances by filling the gaps, providing explanations, and in general enriching 
the child’s utterances. Similarly, Ensor & Hughes (2008) developed an index that 
they call connectedness, which assesses how much parental answers continue the 
child conversational contribution or whether they just push conversation further. 
Both studies found that those indices of the quality of the parental conversation 
correlate with the child’s ability to pass FBT.22 
 My proposal is very close to Hutto’s hypothesis that folk psychological 
narratives have a fundamental role in fostering “an understanding of the forms 
and norms of folk psychology” (Hutto 2007: 53), that is, “our everyday practice of 
making sense of intentional actions (i.e. our own and those of others) in terms of 
reasons” (Hutto 2009: 10). In particular, we share the same idea that dialogical 
interaction with the caregiver is the most important factor for the acquisition of 
                                                
    22 While evidence reported above about the quantity of the conversational input was obtained 
through both correlational and transitional studies, evidence in this case is only corre-
lational, therefore less significant. However, it still suggests that the more that adults are 
prone to elaborate children’s utterances, the earlier the capacity to pass FBT is acquired. 
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the concept of belief while cognitive development only plays a minor role. 
 Although I am very sympathetic with Hutto’s approach, there are 
nevertheless also substantial differences between his and my view. In particular, 
Hutto claims that “children’s nuanced folk psychological skills only develop 
securely after ages four and five” (Hutto 2008: 26) and denies that passing FBT 
marks an important step in children’s mastery of folk psychology.23 Against this, 
I advance that passing FBT denotes an important improvement in children’s 
mastery of folk psychology, because it marks their acquisition of an ability to 
explain people’s behavior in folk psychological terms. 
 The dispute is partially theoretical and partially empirical. As for the 
theoretical facet, I believe that children’s acquired capacity to explain others’ 
reasons to act, which is manifested when they pass FBT, only denotes a minimal 
understanding of folk psychology, which needs time to be turned into a mature 
social competence. Therefore, Hutto does not really oppose my view when he 
claims that folk psychological skills fully develop only after age five or six. 
 However, against Hutto, I also advance a more specific empirical claim and 
propose that children start passing FBT because they learn to explain others’ 
behavior by reporting their reasons to act. This makes a definitive claim about the 
timeline of children’s acquisition of the capacity to pass FBT: Explanatory abili-
ties in the domain of folk psychology should be acquired earlier than the predic-
tive ability necessary to pass FBT. Therefore, my proposal would be supported 
by findings showing that explanatory capacities come in place earlier than the 
time children pass FBT. On the contrary, if it were found that children can pass 
FBT without still being able to express people’s reasons to act, that would 
constitute opposing evidence to my model. 
 Referring to empirical evidence, several studies have already tested the 
correlation between traditional predictive FBT and a modified explanatory version, 
where children are asked to explain the behavior of a main character who just 
acted on the basis of a false belief. Many studies found that the explanatory 
version is as hard as the traditional one (Moses & Flavell 1990; Wimmer & Weich-
bold 1994; Wellman et al. 1996; Wimmer & Mayringer 1998; Perner et al. 2002; 
Atance & O’Neill 2004). This does not explicitly contradict my proposal, although 
it neither supports the presumed role of explanatory abilities in promoting the 
predictive abilities assessed by FBT. Notably, it nevertheless shows, against 
Hutto, that four-year-olds start manifesting important folk psychological compe-
tences: Not only did they correctly predict others’ behavior that depends on the 
attribution of a false belief, but they also justify their predictions by correct expla-
nations. 
 Evidence supporting my proposal comes instead by a few studies specifi-
cally finding that theory-of-mind predictive capacities are anticipated by explan-
                                                
    23 “There is a fairly widespread tendency to conflate the latter sort of ability [to understand 
and attribute beliefs] with a capacity to understand and attribute reasons. This mistake 
stems from assuming, as is commonly done, that children are already in the possession of 
the bulk of their theory of mind at the point at which they begin to pass false-belief tests. 
Hence, success on these tests is taken to be the mark of their having acquired the final piece 
of the theory of mind puzzle. Having mastered the core concept of belief, it is supposed that 
they have mastered the full set of folk psychological principles” (Hutto 2008: 25). 
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atory capacities (Bartsch & Wellman 1989; Bartsch et al. 2007). Careful looking at 
the methodology of these studies shows that they are flawed in the way in which 
they assessed children’s psychological explanatory abilities.24 Nevertheless, we 
should notice that finding a transitional period for the acquisition of abilities is 
always difficult: You can fail because either you look at too old children, or 
because you do not employ fine enough tools. Furthermore, all studies reported 
above always looked at explanatory ability as a yes-or-no competence and did 
not consider that there can be many levels of certainty in reporting one’s reasons 
to act. Serious investigation instead would require keeping those levels 
separated. Future research, more respecting of the ecological validity of prompt-
ing answer methods and of the gradual acquisition of explanatory abilities in the 
domain of folk psychology, may bring clearer results about children’s earlier 
capacity to pass explanatory rather than predictive versions of FBT. 
 Summarizing, predictive and correlational relations between children’s 
capacity to pass FBT and (i) children’s mastery of sentential complements, (ii) the 
quantity of parental conversation involving mental concepts, (iii) the quality of 
parental conversation, and (iv) children’s explanatory capacities in the domain of 
folk psychology all support the claim that four-year-olds’ capacity to pass FBT 
depends on their acquisition of a minimal capacity to report others’ reasons to 
act.  
 This constitutes a significant improvement in our knowledge about social 
cognitive development and its triggering factors. It also leaves us in position to 
judge whether late social cognitive abilities fit the framework of the embodied 
mind. It follows indeed from my analysis that theory-of-mind capacities 
manifested by the ability to pass FBT are acquired by being engaged in a proper 
conversational context. The linguistic competence necessary to pass FBT is thus 
not localized and depends on the whole activity of a brain immersed in its 
natural and social (dialogical) environment. Accordingly, sensory and motor 
processes play a very peripheral role in the capacity to pass FBT: Late theory-of-
mind abilities do not particularly fit the framework of embodied cognition. 
 Even though the capacity to pass FBT does not respect the strictest 
principles of embodiment, it is nevertheless compatible with the closer principles 
of situatedness and embeddedness. Indeed, according to my proposal, children’s 
capacity to predict others’ behavior depends on the mastery of an explanatory 
practice that children refine in conversation with their caregivers. This is a clear 
example of how the embeddedness of cognition in the child’s social environment 
supports high-level cognitive processes such as social understanding. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Although theory of mind has been interpreted for a long as a unified capacity in 
                                                
    24 Indeed, Bartsch & Wellman’s (1989) method to prompt explanations was all but ecologically 
valid. Bartsch et al. (2007) used a more ecological prompting strategy, but their result 
depends on considering passers children that passed just one out of four explanatory false 
belief tasks: if at least two out of four trials are requested, their result is no longer 
significant. 
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the empirical literature, careful consideration of its development really demon-
strates that it stands for a composed competence, which stands in a complex 
relation with the principle of embodiment. Available evidence does not exclude 
that early social cognitive abilities, which are manifested in spontaneous-
response false belief tasks, depend on the activity of embodied cognitive 
processes. This challenges the mentalist view, according to which they must be 
interpreted in the terms of a capacity to attribute false beliefs.  
 Instead, late social cognitive abilities, such as the capacity to pass FBT, are 
the outcome of a process of enculturation: Children learn how to use at their own 
benefit and for predictive purposes the dialogical competence they have 
developed in conversation with their caregivers about others’ reasons to act. This 
makes late social cognitive abilities not depending on the principles of embodied 
cognition. They are nonetheless compatible with it by falling within the borders 
of socially embedded cognition. 
 The present analysis acknowledges that embodied cognition indicates a 
‘unifying perspective’ for psychology (Glenberg 2010). However, it suggests that 
embodiment alone is not sufficient to account for all forms of cognitive 
competences. Whereas the investigation of earlier forms of cognitive activity 
(e.g., infants’ performance in spontaneous-response false belief tasks) requires 
pursuing research on the underlying embodied neural circuitries, expanding our 
knowledge about more advanced forms of comprehension (e.g., social under-
standing) needs to consider how social practices scaffold cognition and genuinely 
expand our cognitive competences. 
 With respect to the case of social understanding, a comprehensive explan-
ation of the capacity to attribute mental states needs an analysis of the dialogical 
and social interaction between the child and the caregiver, which allows the 
former entering the ‘community of minds’ (Nelson 2009). The present analysis 
thus raises skeptical doubts about the empirical investigation of the neural 
circuitries underlying late social cognitive abilities such as the capacity to pass 
FBT (e.g., Saxe et al. 2004). Rather, it points to the study of the mechanics beyond 
dialogical exchanges (e.g., Pickering & Garrod 2004; Ruiter et al. 2006; de Ruiter et 
al. 2010) as a more promising field to start clarifying children’s development of 
social understanding. Some research has already chosen this direction (Ferny-
hough 2008): It is my hope to have contributed to address further investigation 
along this path. 
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